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This paper describes Emergency Systems used by a utility during the Year 2000 rollover.  The systems are analyzed with 
respect to the literature and lessons learned are discussed.  Several factors are identified that impact the design and 
effectiveness of these systems.  These factors are generalized to the overall design and management of current Emergency 
Systems.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Emergency Information Systems (EIS) are used by organizations to assist in responding to a crisis or disaster situation.  
These systems support communications, data gathering and analysis, and decision-making.  EIS are rarely used but when 
needed, must function well and without fail.  Designing and building these systems requires designers to anticipate what will 
be needed, what resources will be available, and how conditions will differ from normal.  A standard model for an EIS is 
from Belardo, et al. (1984) and identifies the components as including a database, data analysis capability, normative models, 
and an interface.  This model is only somewhat useful as it fails to address issues such as how the EIS fits into the overall 
disaster response plan, EIS infrastructure, multiple organization spanning, and integrating multiple systems.  Additionally, 
many organizations do not address the need for an EIS until a disaster happens, and then, only for a few months until 
something more pressing comes up (Jennex, 2003).  The result is that many organizations have an EIS that may not be 
adequate.   
The purpose of this paper is to look at the use of EIS for the Year 2000 (Y2K) rollover and to generalize lessons learned to 
the building of future EIS.  While the rollover to the year 2000 proceeded with few problems, organizations all over the 
world were prepared for disaster.  What makes studying Y2K interesting is that as a scheduled disaster, organizations had 
time to prepare to respond.  This paper will look at how a utility in the United States prepared and implemented their EIS for 
the rollover.  Many lessons pertaining to the design and implementation of EIS were learned and will be presented.  It should 
be noted that much of the data used in this paper was collected by the author in his role as project manager responsible for 
Y2K contingency planning for this utility.  The author was personally responsible for designing and implementing the EIS 
and participated in one of the emergency centers activated for Y2K. 
BACKGROUND 
Emergency Information Systems 
Emergencies and disasters are high stress situations that require organizations to respond in a manner that is different from 
their normal operating procedures (Turoff, 2002).  Patton and Flin (1999) discuss these stresses on emergency managers and 
how to reduce them.  Disaster stressors, in addition to fatigue, include dealing with a complex, unpredictable and dynamic 
response, time pressure, communications, dealing with the media, and operating within an integrated emergency management 
context.  To reduce these stresses, disaster response plans should be based on operational demands, tested regularly, and have 
resources allocated.  These plans should not be based on implicit and untested assumptions that reflect routine operational 
requirements and conditions as plans based on assumed capabilities are less effective than anticipated and will increase ad 
hoc demands on managers.  Working in teams is required during emergencies and having a well trained, experienced team 
will reduce the impact of team dynamic stressor.  Additionally, disasters require inter agency coordination and dealing with 
interagency conflict and terminology increases stress.  These stresses can be reduced if these agencies are integrated in their 
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response and participants train together so that they are familiar with each other and comfortable with the integrated disaster 
response plan.  Finally, communication systems are necessary for getting the right information to the right people, but they 
will not reduce stress unless participants are trained and practiced in their use.   
In addition to the stresses identified by Patton and Flin (1999) and Belardo, et al. (1984) identifies the stress of decision-
making during disaster response and recommends the creation of an EIS to assist decision makers.  The components of the 
EIS, as suggested by Belardo, et al. (1984), were previously mentioned but several researchers have looked at decision stress 
and address methods for decreasing this stress. 
Turoff (2002) expands the discussion on stressors by discussing the philosophy of the United States Office of Emergency 
Preparedness.  Key points of this philosophy are: 
• An EIS not used regularly won’t be used in an actual emergency 
• People in emergencies don’t have time to deal with issues not related to the emergency 
• Learning what actually happened is extremely important to improving emergency response performance 
• It is difficult to predict exactly who will do what during an emergency 
• The crucial problem of the moment drives the allocation of resources 
• Roles can be planned but whoever steps into a role at any given moment defies the attempt to prescribe behavior 
• Need to have confidence in the currency and accuracy of the information provided 
• Exceptions to the planned behavior are crucial factors in determining minute to minute operations 
• Crisis situations require large numbers of individuals to share information without causing information overload 
• Exact actions and responsibilities of individuals cannot be predetermined due to unforeseen events occurring during the 
crisis 
To improve the EIS Turoff, (2002) suggests having multiple templates for a variety of actions that can be modified as needed.  
These templates should be able to be used by individuals initiating notifications using Personal Data Assistants (PDAs).  
Additionally, these notifications should be self-organizing and all entered data tagged with the name/ID and time entered of 
the person entering the data.  Finally, online communities of experts should be utilized to assist with the emergency. 
Lee and Bui (2000) studied the Kobe, Japan earthquake disaster response and also propose using a template based EIS.  
However, they observed that: 
• The urgency in a disaster require that as much relevant information for resolving the disaster be gathered and stored prior 
to the disaster 
• Disaster information processing should be case based with lessons learned from previous disasters used to build new cases 
• To minimize stress the response processes and workflows should be as automated as possible 
Andersen, et al. (1998) investigated the use of Lotus Notes as a form/template driven EIS and identified several potential 
communication problems: 
• A sequence of messages from one organizational unit to another is misunderstood due to the initial message not being 
opened or lost 
• A command is misinterpreted as information (and not recognized as a command) by the receiver due to grammar issues 
• Decision makers and other personnel at emergency response centers are overwhelmed by bookkeeping while keeping track 
of responses to commands and messages 
• The meaning of a message is misunderstood when the message is not seen in the context of other messages to which it is 
related 
• Even though the emergency plan is well known there are still delays in communicating alarms and commands to relevant 
organizations and getting responses 
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Fischer (1998) discussed the application of new technologies to emergency mitigation, response, and recovery and observed 
some issues associated with the technology used in an EIS.  These issues include information overload, loss of information, 
retention of outdated information, the greater likelihood of the diffusion of inappropriate information, further diminution of 
non-verbal communication, and the inevitability of computer failures.   
To improve the effectiveness of an EIS and the emergency response team several researchers recommend training (Patton and 
Flin, 1999, Turoff, 2002, Andersen, et al., 1998, Lee and Bui, 2000, Fischer, 1998, Renaud and Phillips (2003)).  Patton and 
Flin (1999) found that training exercises and simulations must test assumptions and examine procedural and conceptual 
issues to ensure the EIS and emergency response processes will work when needed.  Fischer (1998) proposes the use of 
distance learning technologies to ensure distributed emergency response teams are trained.  Turoff (2002) discusses how an 
EIS that isn’t normally used won’t be used in an emergency.   
Others suggest modifications and/or additions to the EIS.  Fischer (1998) advocates using technologies such as CD/DVD 
based storage media, Web/Internet sites as a common infrastructure providing access for disaster response teams distributed 
across multiple locations/organizations, and e-mail for improving communications.  Gheorghe and Vamanu (2001) suggest 
adding Geographical Information System (GIS) and satellite capabilities to the EIS.  Nisha de Silva (2001) expands on using 
GIS to aid decision-making during emergencies but warns of integration difficulties with other technologies.  Gadomski, et 
al. (2001) discuss using case based reasoning, artificial intelligence and intelligent agents to aid decision makers during an 
emergency.  They believe real time operational data, data from operational systems, and a user friendly interface are needed 
by decision makers. 
Finally, as a response to possible loss of the EIS infrastructure, Renaud and Phillips (2003) discuss the creation of 
Infrastructure Continuity Plans for Infrastructure Continuity Units (usually buildings).  These were created for Y2K and 
incorporated detailed equipment information, data on failures, and detailed response procedures.  This effort was coordinated 
across the Public Works and Government Services of Canada and is being evaluated for application by commercial 
organizations. 
Year 200 and Utilities 
The smooth transition to January 1, 2000 was not an indication of the seriousness of Y2K or of the amount of work and 
preparation that utilities expended.  Since electrical utilities are a key component of civilization’s infrastructure, it was 
considered prudent that a system should be in place to immediately respond should Y2K cause disruption to the electric grid.  
It was recognized that electric system failures could have had substantial impact on the health and safety of the general 
population, business continuity across all sectors of the economy, and national security.  Electric power system testing at the 
onset of Y2K preparations demonstrated clearly that the failure to remediate equipment would likely have caused operational 
problems.  These problems would have increased the risk of interruptions of electricity supply and delivery (Cauley and 
Roth, 2000).  Some examples of problems found preparing utilities for Y2K included: 
• Distributed Control Systems (DCS) in modern, non-nuclear power generating plants in some cases displayed date 
manipulation problems that locked up programs and would have resulted in unit shutdown. 
• Computer controller BIOS operating system failures. 
• Alarm annunciator systems problems. 
• Client server hardware and software 
• PC hardware, software, and operating systems 
• Network management software 
• PBX’s – some require remediation 
• Miscellaneous digital controllers 
• Substation programmable controllers some required repairs. 
As a result, even though all major utilities were reported ready prior to the rollover (NRC, 1999, Cauley and Roth, 2000), 
preparations were made for major disruptions should they occur.  These plans included contingency planning for loss of 
components, systems, and plants and the preparation for emergency staffing including the activation of emergency response 
centers. 
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Y2K EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Due to public concern there were many organizations involved in Y2K.  Utilities, in addition to their own emergency 
response centers and EIS, needed to work with the North American Reliability Council (NERC) the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) who also acted for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), various federal and 
local regulatory agencies, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).  All of these 
organizations had emergency response centers and many had an EIS.  Some of these organizations focused on emergency 
response during the rollover, others focused on early warning EIS.  Some of these systems are discussed below.   
NERC Y2K Information Center 
The NERC Y2K Information Center was a password protected, Internet-based information collection system that was added 
on top of normal utility emergency response systems.  The normal emergency response systems are comprised of a hierarchy 
of operations centers equipped with status and communication systems and staffed with operators trained to respond to 
system events and emergencies.  Emergency response is practiced on a regular basis and controlled through a set of 
established protocols and emergency response procedures.  The NERC Y2K Information Center was established to provide a 
central location for status on events caused by Y2K failures or occurring during Y2K.  Data input was standardized with the 
ability to provide narrative description maintained.  NERC limited the system to 400 designated information providers and an 
expanded but limited number of read only observers.  Additionally, a series of conference calls were held to provide status 
for the rollover of each region.  Backup communications were provided by an emergency satellite telephone system.  The EIS 
was practiced through a series of drills corresponding to April 9, 1999 (the 99th day of 1999) and September 9, 1999 (9/9/99) 
rollovers.  Success of the EIS was hard to judge due to a lack of events meeting the reporting criteria (about 13 events were 
reported, all minor) resulting in little need to use the system. 
EPRI Early Warning System 
The EPRI early warning system was a password protected, Internet-based information collection system.  The system 
provided general users a color-coded status screen for various types of systems, regions, or vendors identified by contributors 
as being critical or susceptible.  Details for each status window were obtained by clicking on the status window.  Contributors 
input status through a series of input screens.  Input screens were based on standard templates and utilized standard 
terminology.  A training and user manual was provided users upon request.  Hands-on user training was provided in October 
1999 at an EPRI Y2K user group meeting.  A trial run of the system was performed in November 1999 to ensure the system 
would work.  The system was in operation for two days prior to the rollover through three days after the rollover (EPRI, 
1999).  Success of the system was hard to judge due to early Internet problems limiting access during the initial rollovers, a 
lack of detailed data being provided by participants, and a lack of Y2k issues early in its operation causing users to lose 
interest. 
Utility Y2K Rollover Reporting System 
Utility organizational units with continuous operations and mission critical electric utility systems, key facility systems and 
business processes and systems employing date-sensitive assets reported status during the Y2K rollover to the Y2K Project 
Management Office (PMO) using a special EIS.  The EIS was a computerized template-based system, a dedicated conference 
call system, and a backup radio system. 
The Y2K PMO created a spreadsheet of mission critical assets and distributed it in Excel 95 files to all operating units for use 
in reporting and emergency response during the Y2K Rollover.  Additionally, the Y2K PMO prepared a set of report 
templates using Microsoft Word 95, a dictionary of standard terminology and codes, and shared email folders for use in the 
rollover reporting system.  Standard reports were generated at preset intervals and transmitted via Microsoft Exchange or 
other email systems.  The reports were: (Jennex, et al., 1999b) 
• Y2K Rollover Status Report 
• Y2K Rollover Event Reports 
• Post-Y2K Rollover Validation Testing Status 
• Y2K Early Warning Reports 
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EIS TRAINING DRILLS 
State Y2K Drills 
A state wide drill was conducted to test and practice Y2K Rollover communication systems on September 9, 1999.  All 
system operators were required to participate and test various systems including primary and backup communications, the 
pager system, and satellite communications systems.  Test results were positive and indicated improvement over the April 9, 
1999 drill.  However, further testing, training and protocol development were needed to improve Satellite communications.  
Also, many organizations still needed to install satellite systems and participate in further drills.  Additionally, further 
evaluation of the Scheduling Coordinator pager system was necessary as it took an unacceptable amount of time for pages to 
be received (20 to 25 minutes after page issuance) and some operators did not call in as directed.  Finally, it took longer than 
anticipated to complete each portion of the drill due to the nature and volume of drill communications.  The result was that 
communications for the second phase of the test were being received while the first phase was being completed creating 
confusion for the drill leaders (ISO, 1999). 
The second phase of the drill used a variety of scenarios consisting of random lists of data points periodically handed to the 
Security Coordinators.  The Security Coordinators were instructed that they had just lost the respective data points and 
directed to go get them through any means possible.  This was designed to simulate a real-time loss of telemeter data.  Loss 
of time to the issues listed above caused this portion of the drill to be shortened.  However, it was considered successfully 
completed although not all participants were able to complete their tasks (ISO, 1999). 
Utility Y2K Drills 
The utility prepared its emergency response staff to respond to potential Y2K issues and to use the EIS through a series of 
three drills/training sessions held in December 1999.  The first provided training focused on identifying roles and 
responsibilities of participants, communication flow paths, information requirements, schedules, and an overview of the EIS.  
This was primarily a classroom presentation with an extensive question and answer period.  Direction was also provided on 
how the subsequent drills would be performed.  All personnel expected to be manning emergency response centers during the 
rollover attended the session (Jennex, et al., 1999c) 
The second session was a communications drill performed one week after the training session.  This drill was to ensure each 
emergency center could establish communications with the Y2K PMO emergency center and send in reports in the proper 
format.  Reporting was done using the expected time frame planned for the rollover.  The drill was followed by a critique that 
identified problems with using naming conventions and email transfer of files (file names in some cases were truncated 
making it hard to identify the report), staffing issues associated with handling a large number of reports in the Y2K PMO, 
call restoration protocols, message formatting, login issues, and proper responses during conference calls.  Follow up training 
was accomplished during the following three days and in advance of the third drill.  Computer and network configurations 
were observed to be a problem and all emergency centers were requested to do a complete Y2K setup for the third drill.  
Finally, the need for a roll over reporting guide with step-by-step procedures was recognized and generated for use in the 
third drill (Jennex, et al., 1999c). 
The third drill was a full dress rehearsal.  All emergency response centers were setup and staffed just as expected for the Y2K 
rollover.  The first phase of the drill allowed each emergency response center to perform drills for their local areas.  The 
second phase of the drill involved establishing full communications with the Y2K PMO center and then practicing the loss of 
each communication system and the establishment of each back up communication system.  Report filing was practiced on an 
as needed basis with those centers needing to demonstrate they could file reports properly.  Post drill critique was performed.  
Issues identified included changing to the radio as the first backup to the conference call rather than the corporate phone 
system due to the second phone system being cumbersome.  Additionally there were still some issues with the templates and 
terminology and some local computer issues.  These were resolved in follow up training over the next few days.  Changes 
were made to the rollover-reporting guide as needed and the guide was finalized for rollover via a conference call on 
December 29, 1999.  Follow up drills were done with individual emergency response centers as needed to ensure participants 
and sites were ready (Jennex, et al., 1999c). 
ANALYSIS 
The major issue encountered was the integration of the various EIS.  This issue was not technical; it was caused by all the 
various organizations (both internal and external) needing to have their own data and their own systems.  Integration was 
accomplished through the central Y2K PMO center and worked well.  However, for an unscheduled emergency this may be 
difficult.  The nuclear industry accomplishes this integration in much the same way through the use of emergency centers 
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located at each nuclear facility.  All local organizations have desks and phone communications and are trained together as a 
team.  This approach was used for Y2K and was successful.  Building the Y2K emergency response team through the series 
of drills conducted in December 1999 melded the participants into a cohesive team.  Slogans such as one company, one team 
backed up by shirts and other paraphernalia were successful in overcoming group rivalries for the duration of the event.  It is 
recommended that all emergency response teams that involve multiple organizations practice regularly and take steps to 
establish a team identity. 
The one technical issue identified with integrating a variety of EISs was data formats.  Each organization tended to have their 
own format making it difficult to integrate data.  This was accomplished by cut and paste and it was recognized that should 
Y2K have been a major disaster, this would not have worked.  It is strongly recommended that a common emergency data 
structure be adopted on a national scale.  It is expected that this will be difficult given that the utility industry could not do it 
with NERC, EPRI, and NEI each having their own data standard and neither being willing to change. 
The literature suggests the use of templates and common terminology.  This was followed with good success.  Once 
emergency response personnel were trained the use of templates greatly alleviated message overload and minimized 
communication errors.  All company senior management were fully briefed (either in person or via fax) on the status of the 
entire company within an hour of the rollover and public relations personnel had press reports issued within 45 minutes of the 
rollover.  It should be noted that a significant training effort was needed to generate this success.  This supports the literature 
in its recommendation for training.  Also, without training or with minimal training it was found that templates could give a 
false sense of knowledge as the template based reports did not reflect what the sender was trying to say.  It should also be 
noted that creating templates and common terminology is not as easy as it seems as this case involved multiple organizations 
and cultures that were very diverse in function.  Finding a common terminology and getting people to follow a template that 
is different than their own requires top management support and a strong emergency manager in order to overcome 
organizational cultural and political differences. 
Hardware and software aspects of the EIS were found to be problematic with respect to getting consistent setups.  EIS 
equipment that is used for routine operations when not involved in emergency response cannot be counted on to be able to be 
immediately plugged into the EIS.  Setup procedures with system settings were needed to ensure the emergency centers could 
be established quickly and integrate into the overall EIS.  These issues were identified during the drills and again emphasize 
the need for practicing and using the EIS prior to an emergency. 
As the literature suggests, drills and training are crucial to the successful operation of an emergency center.  Every drill found 
issues that when resolved, improved the performance of the emergency team.  Given that many organizations have transient 
workers, turnover should be expected.  This implies that organizations need to drill and train on a continual basis. 
The use of contingency plans for equipment, system, and infrastructure failures provides very useful decision models for 
emergency personnel.  A large number of contingency plans were written and practiced for Y2K and were ready to facilitate 
decision-making.  It should also be noted that this effort was not wasted as it was found during disaster recovery reviews 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks that the Y2K contingency plans were valid for a variety of emergencies (Jennex, 2003). 
Internet based systems seemed to have more reliability issues than traditional systems.  This was probably due to 
unreasonable expectations of Internet Service Provider reliability and an expected lower number of Internet users during the 
rollover.  While there isn’t enough evidence to support not using Internet based EIS, it is interesting to note that these 
systems seemed to fail at critical times, probably due to high Internet traffic.  It is not unreasonable to assume that following 
a disaster Internet traffic will dramatically increase due to people outside the affected area trying to get information while 
decreasing within the affected area if phone lines are impacted by the disaster. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although Y2K was rather uneventful the preparation that went into it yields insights into how organizations can better 
prepare themselves for disaster response.  These lessons are considered applicable to any organization, as none of the issues 
identified in the preparation of these EIS were unique to the electrical industry.  The major lessons learned are: 
• Create organization (if possible industry) wide templates and terminology 
• Train and drill with the EIS on a periodic basis to ensure personnel can use the EIS and help overcome political and 
cultural issues in multi-organization teams 
• Use contingency plans as a decision model 
• Either have dedicated emergency equipment or have good setup procedures 
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• Standardize data to support integration with other EIS 
• Utilize multiple communication methods including wired and wireless networks 
• Don’t rely on the reliability of the Internet 
Two major issues were identified impeding the effective use of an EIS.  First is the integration of multiple EIS.  Several 
issues were identified impacting integration.  Technical issues included multiple data formats and communications methods, 
specifically different email systems.  However, the most significant issues affecting integration were political and cultural 
considerations.  Organizational politics impacted decision processes and influenced the selection of hardware and software, 
oftentimes resulting in non-optimal selections.  Additionally, the politics of data and “turf” control resulted in multiple 
systems being used for the same event as no organization was willing to give up control of its sphere of influence (note that 
the NRC and NEI had an EIS for nuclear plants, NERC an EIS for transmission, EPRI an EIS for conventional power 
generation and distribution, and utilities had EIS for their service areas).  Most of this is due to legal requirements placed on 
the organizations and suggests that full EIS integration will not occur until legislation governing emergency response are 
changed to allow for central control.  The events of 9/11 support this and are leading to reform with the creation of the central 
Homeland Defense department and legislation mandating common data formats and reporting (note that much current effort 
is being spent on integrating law enforcement data systems which will lead to better EIS integration).  The final issue with 
organizational culture is the formulation of a common, emergency response ontology.  Many problems were encountered 
with personnel from different organizations not understanding the terms used by other organizations.   
Second is training.  The literature reports that an EIS not trained will not be used.  This case supports that and goes further by 
saying that an EIS that is not trained may not even function.  The value of training is in identifying issues that would have 
prevented the EIS from effective operation.  Chief among these are timing, formatting, and resource issues.  Timing of 
messages and activities was found to be very optimistic and had to be adjusted to allow EIS personnel time to assimilate 
messages and make decisions.  Formatting was an issue, as it did not matter how clear the template or procedures were, 
personnel under stress make mistakes unless they are well trained.  Resource allocation was an issue as it was done 
optimistically resulting in too few personnel for assigned tasks and. allocated equipment either didn’t work or didn’t have 
needed capacity.  Training proved to be an invaluable tool for ensuring that the EIS functioned as expected. 
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